The ways that analogy alters the representation of target information was investigated in 4 experiments. Participants read information about a target, followed by a potential source analog. Participants later completed a recognition test in which some of the sentences were old, some novel, and some analogical inferences that were not seen before. Participants who read the description of a source analog erroneously recognized analogical inferences as being in the target description. The effect occurred with different delays between study and test and with an unfamiliar target domain. It also occurred when source and target shared few superficial features. Reading-time data suggest that participants were drawing analogical inferences when encoding the source. Overall, these experiments show that analogical inferences are incorporated in the representation of the target and cannot be differentiated from information actually presented.
Analogy is thought to be a powerful mechanism for the acquisition of new knowledge and conceptual change Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Keane 1997) . Previously acquired knowledge-the source-can be mapped onto another domain-the target. By mapping from a source to a target, problems can be solved (Kolodner, 1997; Ross & Kilbane, 1997) , familiar situations can be used in persuasion (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Voss, Kennet, Wiley, & Schooler, 1992) , and wellunderstood cases can provide the basis for scientific discovery in a new domain (Dunbar, 1995 (Dunbar, , 1997 (Dunbar, , 2001 . Analogy is thus a mechanism that can potentially alter the underlying representation of knowledge. In the series of experiments presented here, we investigated one way in which analogical reasoning may lead to changes in representation: the modification of the target representation through inclusion of analogical inferences.
The process by which a source is mapped onto a target has been the focus of much empirical and theoretical work. Mapping is thought to be the central component of analogical reasoning. It is through mapping that new knowledge can potentially be added to the target. Detailed models have been proposed that articulate the cognitive mechanisms underlying mapping (Forbus, Gentner, & Law, 1994; Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Keane, Ledgeway, & Duff, 1994 ). Yet, little empirical research has been conducted on the consequences of mapping. Specifically, although it would follow from most models that analogical mapping can lead to changes in the target representation, no research has been conducted to determine whether, using analogy, target representations are significantly altered. We first describe empirical and theoretical work on analogical mapping and discuss possible consequences of this process. We then discuss another motivation for our experiments, the research documenting important failures in analogy use, before providing an overview of the experiments included in the article.
Analogical Mapping and Representational Change
Although there are differences between specific theoretical models of analogy (Forbus et al., 1994; Gentner, 1983; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Keane et al., 1994; Novick & Holyoak, 1991) , the following are generally recognized as the main stages involved in analogical reasoning: encoding, retrieval, and mapping. Among those different stages, mapping is often considered to be the crux of analogical reasoning. This is because mapping is the stage at which knowledge about the source is carried over to the target. For instance, if a person is trying to solve a target problem he or she can use a source problem for which a solution is known. If the structure of the two problems can be aligned, the solution for the source problem can be transferred to the target problem (Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997) . Thus, new knowledge is created, that is, something that was not known about the target is inferred, on the basis of the comparison with the source. This is the feature that makes analogy a powerful cognitive tool (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Markman, 1997) .
Empirical research on mapping has provided important insights concerning how people map from a source to a target. Specifically, different constraints placed on the mapping process have been identified. Mapping is mainly driven by the underlying structural properties of the problem (Clement & Gentner, 1991; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Gentner & Toupin, 1986; Keane, 1997) . People are more likely to draw inferences that preserve structural correspondence between the source and the target and that fit in larger relational structures. However, semantic information contained in the two problems can also have an impact. Given equal structural correspondence, people prefer to map objects that are similar (Bassok, 1990; Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Ross, 1987 Ross, , 1989 Ross & Kilbane, 1997) . Pragmatic considerations, such as the goal of the analogizer, the order in which the elements are presented, or working-memory capacity also constrain the mapping process (Holyoak, Waltz, Tohill, Lau, & Grewal, 1999; Keane, 1997; Spellman & Holyoak, 1996) .
Detailed models of analogical mapping have been provided to account for these different results (Falkenheimer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; Forbus et al., 1994; Holyoak & Hummel, 2001; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997; Keane et al., 1994) . All models describe a process by which information is carried over from the source onto the target. The potential importance of analogical mapping for representational change is often stressed. Yet, little research has investigated precisely what the consequences of mapping are.
One possible consequence of analogical mapping that has been investigated is abstraction (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Gick & Paterson, 1992; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Lowenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999) . Analogical mapping can lead to the creation of an abstract schema corresponding to the underlying structure that was mapped from the source onto the target. Especially when people are exposed to more than two analogs, common features can be abstracted and stored as a content-free schema that can then be applied to novel situations (Gick & Holyoak, 1983) . Thus, one possible consequence of mapping is that higher level reasoning structures can be abstracted from the process.
Most models would predict that analogical mapping can also have effects at the same level of abstraction on the representation of the target. Two possibilities exist. The inferences could be used while mapping, in a goal-directed way, and only temporarily change the representation of the target. Another possibility is that the analogical inferences more permanently alter the representation of the target. In this case, inferences would be integrated into the representation of the target and thus remain part of the target after mapping is over. This is the specific hypothesis that we wanted to investigate in this series of experiments.
To examine whether and how analogical mapping alters representations, one must compare the target representation of people who have mapped a source analog with that of people who have not been given a source analog. One way to make this comparison is to look at memory for target information. By comparing memory for a target in people who did and did not map a source, one would be able to determine the effect of analogical mapping. One area of research in which this type of methodology has been used is text comprehension (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Graesser & Bertus, 1998; Long, Oppy, & Seely, 1997; van Overwalle, Drenth, & Marsman, 1999; Uleman, Hon, Roman, & Moscowitz, 1996) . Much research shows that certain types of inferences are made while reading a text (Graesser, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Seifert, 1990; Singer, Revlin, & Halldorson, 1990) and that this alters the representation of target information. This conclusion is based on the fact that in memory tests, inferences are falsely recognized as having been presented in the text (Bransford, Barclay, & Franks, 1972; Bransford & Franks, 1971 Johnson, Bransford, & Solomon, 1973; Lorch & van den Broek, 1997; van den Broek, 1994) . For instance, in one study (Johnson et al., 1973) , experimenters presented people with the following sentence: When the man entered the kitchen he slipped on a wet spot and dropped the delicate glass pitcher on the floor. In a later recognition test, participants were likely to answer that the sentence When the man entered the kitchen he slipped on a wet spot and broke the delicate glass pitcher when it fell on the floor had been presented, which is false. People appear to be drawing the inference that the pitcher broke (because it was delicate and that it fell on the floor) and integrating this inference in their representation of the information, which leads them to make errors on the recognition test. Thus, such research has shown that inferences that are drawn can alter representation for target information. We were interested in whether analogical mapping could have the same effect on memory. If a target was presented, followed by a source, could the inferences drawn on the basis of analogical mapping be integrated in the representation of the target? If this were the case, it would indicate one mechanism through which analogy can change underlying representations.
Failure to Use Analogy: Transfer Failures
Although analogy can be a powerful tool to acquire new information, there are potential limits to the use of this tool. Much research has been conducted on a phenomenon known as transfer failure, by which people often fail to retrieve potentially useful source analogs (Gick & Holyoak, 1980 Keane, 1987; Novick, 1988; Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Ross, 1987 Ross, , 1989 . In this type of research, people are first presented with a source problem. When later presented with a target problem, they often do not spontaneously notice the relevance of the source, specifically when the source lacks surface similarity with the target. When told that the first problem can be used to solve the second one, participants can generally map and draw the inference to solve the target problem.
Thus, many studies show that a serious restriction on the use of analogy lies in the retrieval stage. It is yet unclear whether a similar problem is found at the mapping stage. That is, if there is no need to retrieve a source, when source and target are presented together, will people make mappings and draw inferences? Studies looking at the mapping stage provide participants with the source and target together but, in addition, directly ask participants to map one onto the other (Clement & Gentner, 1991; DellarosaCummins, 1992; Keane, 1997; Ross, 1989; Spellman & Holyoak, 1992 . One question of interest, then, is whether participants would draw inferences if not instructed to do so. It is still unclear whether people show mapping failure and, if so, under what circumstances. This question has important implications. If people show widespread mapping failure, then the usefulness of analogy as a cognitive tool may be substantially limited. If, however, analogical mapping is obtained without much prompting, this would suggest that models of analogical reasoning are correct to emphasize its importance as a general cognitive tool (Hofstadter, 2001; Hummel & Holyoak, 1997) . This is the second research question that we sought to examine through the experiments reported in this article.
Another motivation for the studies stems from our naturalistic studies of analogy use, particularly in politics (Blanchette & Dunbar, 1997 ). The way that analogy is used in politics falls somewhere between the transfer and mapping experiments. In this naturalistic situation, sources and targets are presented to the audience but the mappings and inferences are left implicit. For example, a politician commented on the results of the 1995 Quebec referendum (which was won by the "no" side by a very small number of votes) by using an analogy to a house in need of repair: "Canada's foundations are cracking. Tonight, none of that is repaired. When the foundations are so badly damaged, patching it will not prevent the collapse. We have to rebuild" ). This exemplifies how the target problem is often only invoked, and the mappings are left implicit. We found the same was true in studies in which we asked students to generate analogies on different political and nonpolitical issues (Blanchette & Dunbar, 2000; Dunbar, Blanchette, Caouette, & Lo, 2002) . Thus, it is not only theoretically but also pragmatically important to determine whether people do in fact engage in analogical mapping when they are presented with a target and a source analog.
Overview of Studies
The goal of these experiments was to answer two main questions. First, do analogical inferences alter the representation of target information? Second, will people draw analogical inferences without being instructed to make mappings, when presented with a target and a source analog? To investigate these questions, we asked participants to read a text about a target issue. In the experimental condition, the text ended with the description of a source analog. We used political issues, as we found in our previous research that politics is one domain in which analogies are often used (Blanchette & Dunbar, 1997) . As we wanted to closely map situations found in naturalistic use of analogy, no mappings or inferences were given explicitly in the text. Furthermore, there were no instructions to map or use the analogical source in any way. We later tested participants' memory for the information presented. In doing so, we wanted to examine whether we could find evidence of analogical inferences being included in participants' representations.
The order in which the target and source information was presented (target information first, followed by the source) was motivated by two factors. First, this closely parallels the ways in which analogies are used in naturalistic contexts such as political debates and scientific lab meetings (Blanchette & Dunbar, 1997 Dunbar, 1997) . For example, a prototypical analogy in politics might take the form "Problem A is similar to problem B, where . . . ," with A and B referring to the target and source, respectively. Second and most important, this follows directly from our interest in looking at representational change. The target information was presented first. Thus, participants formed a representation of the target domain. The source was presented after the target representation had been achieved. This allowed us to determine whether participants, after having formed a representation of the target, would alter this representation as a result of analogical reasoning.
A corollary issue is whether mapping failure will occur. In mapping experiments, participants are generally presented with the source and target simultaneously, as well as being asked to map and draw inferences. With our methodology, source and target were presented together, and the link between the two was pointed out but participants were not directly instructed to engage in mapping and draw inferences. This allowed us to explore the generality of the use of analogy in representational change. One possibility is that participants could fail to engage in mapping and draw inferences. If such mapping failure were common, then analogy may not be as important a tool for representational change as has been argued.
In Experiment 1, we explored these issues using a recognition test, and we manipulated the length of the text we gave to participants. In Experiment 2, we included a condition in which we explicitly provided the inferences in the text and compared it with the condition in which the inferences were not given. In Experiment 3, we extended the research to a new topic in which the source and target shared few superficial features and with which participants were not familiar. In Experiment 4, we examined participants' reading times for the source passage to determine when the analogical inferences may have been drawn.
Experiment 1
In this experiment, participants read an information text on a social-political issue. We manipulated two variables: the presence of an analogy and the length of the text participants had to read. Participants in the experimental group read a text and then a description of a potential source analog that was included at the end of the text. Participants in the control condition read the same target text without the description of the source analog at the end. In addition, we manipulated the length of the text we gave participants. Data from pilot studies that we conducted suggested that the amount of information that participants received on the target issue may be an important factor. Thus, we created two conditions. Some participants read a one-paragraph introduction to the issue (short version), whereas others read a four-page text providing more information on the issue (long version). One week later, participants came back to the lab and completed a recognition test.
We included three different types of items in the recognition test: sentences that were actually in the text (text items), inferences that could be drawn based on the analogy presented (analogical inferences), and items that were not in the text and that were not related to the analogy (novel items). In addition, we included one item to directly test memory for the analogical source.
Method

Participants and Procedure
Fifty-two undergraduate students from McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, participated in the experiment either for extra course credits or to be entered in a lottery for a monetary prize. Participants completed a first session, during which they read an introductory text concerning a current political debate. The description of a source analog followed for participants in the analogy condition. After having read this text, participants answered two reasoning questions. One week later, participants came back to the laboratory for a second session, during which they completed the recognition test. Participants completed the recognition test in writing. Four participants, one from each of the conditions, did not complete the second session of the experiment and were dropped from the analyses.
Materials
Information texts. The target issue was the legalization of marijuana. The text presented general issues related to drug policies and how to deal with harmful effects associated with drug use. Arguments both for legalizing marijuana and for the status quo were presented. The source analog was the period of the prohibition of alcohol. It described how people continued to use alcohol even though it was illegal and how a black market for alcohol products developed. The description of the source analog was inserted at the end of the text by using the sentence "The situation with marijuana can be compared to . . . ." A short paragraph then described the source analog. There were no analogical inferences in the text. Statements about the source were not mapped onto the target. In the no-analogy condition, participants read the same text but no source analog was presented. The last paragraph containing that description was omitted.
To vary the length of the text presented, two versions were prepared. The long version of the text was four pages long. It gave detailed information on the issue, often contradictory information, and it presented arguments for both sides. The text contained 1,049 words and 50 different facts. The short version of the text contained only one paragraph consisting of 109 words and 7 basic facts.
Recognition test. We designed a recognition test to examine participants' memory for different types of information. For each of a series of statements, participants had to indicate whether the statement was, or was not, in the text that they had read the previous week. The precise instructions were as follows: "You will now read statements related to the legalization of marijuana. From memory, indicate whether each statement was or was not in the text that you read last week. Circle YES if you think it was in the text, or circle NO if you think it wasn't in the text. Be as accurate as possible." Three different types of items were included: text items (statements that were actually in the text), analogical inferences (statements that were not in the text but were inferences that could be drawn on the basis of the analogy described), and novel items (statements that were not in the text and that were not related to the analogy). Analogical inferences were derived by mapping all statements about the source on to the target. For each sentence contained in the one-paragraph description of the source, we simply replaced words or concepts identified to the source with the equivalent concepts for the target. For example, the statement "The government set up agencies to control the quality and take over the distribution of alcohol" became the following analogical inference: "The government could set up agencies to control the quality and take over the distribution of marijuana." (See Appendix A for the list of all inferences.) Novel items are statements that were not in the text and that were not related to the analogy. Examples include the following: "Legalization of marijuana would provide people with an alternative to chemical medical treatments." In addition to these different types of items, one item directly tested participants' memory of the analogy itself: "There was a comparison made to the period when alcohol was prohibited." This item was included at the very end of the questionnaire.
Special attention was paid in devising the statements so that the three different types of items were equivalent in terms of number of words. The mean number of words in text items, novel items, and analogical inferences was 19, 17, and 15, respectively. These means were not significantly different, F(2, 35) ϭ 2.43, p Ͼ .05.
We made two versions of the test, one for each of the two versions of the target text. For participants reading the long version, the test included 13 text items, 14 novel items, 7 analogical inferences, and 1 item testing memory for the analogical source, for a total of 35 items. For the short version, the test included 6 text items, 6 novel items, 7 analogical inferences, and 1 item testing memory for the analogical source, for a total of 20 items. The text items were different from those used in the test for the long condition. The novel items were a subset of the ones used in the long condition, and the analogical inferences were exactly the same, because the source analog in both conditions was the same. Item order was randomized to create three test versions.
Three separate measures were derived from participants' answers to the recognition test. Proportion of "yes" answers were computed separately for text items, novel items, and analogical inferences. For each type of item, this score represents the number of "yes" answers over the total number of items.
Results
We performed a 3 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the proportion of "yes" answers with item type (text item, novel item, analogical inferences) as a within-subject factor and condition (analogy, no analogy) and text version (long, short) as between-subjects factors. This analysis revealed a significant interaction between condition and item type, F(2, 88) ϭ 9.28, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ .271. The means of the different groups are presented in Table 1 . Tests of simple effects revealed that there was a significant difference between the analogy and no-analogy groups in the average proportion of "yes" answers to analogical inferences, t(46) ϭ 3.76, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ .836. Participants in the analogy condition answered "yes" more frequently than those in the no-analogy group (M ϭ .51, SD ϭ .25, and M ϭ .25, SD ϭ .23, respectively), thus supporting our prediction. Furthermore, as predicted, there was no difference in proportion of "yes" answers to text items, t(46) ϭ Ϫ0.79, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .015; and novel items, t(46) ϭ 1.80, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .102.
The overall ANOVA also shows that the pattern of answers to the different types of items was similar when participants read the long and short versions of the text. Specifically, the three way Analogy Condition ϫ Text Version ϫ Item Type interaction was not significant, F(2, 88) ϭ 0.85, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .025. Examination of the means (see Table 1 ) shows that with both the short and long versions, participants who read the analogy were more likely to incorrectly answer "yes" to analogical inferences. There was however a main effect of text version, F(1, 44) ϭ 8.93, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ .196. Again, means in Table 1 show that participants who read more information (long version) were generally more likely to answer "yes" to all types of items, across the analogy and noanalogy conditions.
We computed two additional measures to compare sensitivity across the different groups. For each participant, we first computed the proportion of hits ("yes" answers to text items) minus the proportion of false alarms ("yes" answers to novel items). Means for the different conditions are reported in Table 1 . It appears that the answers of participants in the analogy condition were slightly less sensitive overall, generally because of a greater tendency to commit false alarms. However, we also computed a measure of differential false alarms by subtracting, for each participant, the proportion of false alarms ("yes" answers) to novel items from the proportion of false alarms ("yes" answers) to analogical inferences, also reported in Table 1 . These numbers show that the rate of differential false alarms was in fact higher in the analogy condition than in the control conditions. We also analyzed whether differences could be found between the different groups on memory for the analogical source. The last item in the questionnaire tested memory for a "comparison made to the period when alcohol was prohibited." We analyzed participants' answers to this question using a 2 ϫ 2 ANOVA, with text length and condition as between-subjects factors. There was a significant main effect of condition, F(1, 44) ϭ 38.05, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ 5.330. Participants who had read the description of the analogical source (analogy condition) answered "yes" to this item more than participants who had not received the analogy. There was no main effect of text version, F(1, 44) ϭ 0.59, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .083; nor a two-way interaction, F(1, 48) ϭ 0.59, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .083. Participants reading both the short and long versions remembered the analogical source when one had been presented. Overall, 92% of participants in the analogy condition answered "yes" compared with 25% in the no-analogy condition.
Discussion
The results of this experiment are consistent with our hypotheses. Participants who had read the description of a source analog erroneously recognized analogical inferences, although these statements had not in fact been presented in the text. This suggests one possible way in which analogical inferences can lead to representational change: through the integration of analogical inferences in the target representation. Participants initially read information about a target domain. After the participants formed a representation, a potential source analog was presented. Our results are consistent with the hypothesis that participants engaged in analogical reasoning and drew inferences and that these inferences altered the initial target representation. This led to errors on the recognition test: participants erroneously believing that analogical inferences had in fact been presented. The results further show no evidence of mapping failure. Although participants were not instructed to make any mappings or draw inferences, they appear to have engaged in analogical reasoning, and this led to alterations in their representation of the target issue.
Comparison of sensitivity across the groups suggests that participants who read the analogical source generally had poorer memory for the target text (with less difference between hits and false alarms) than participants in the control condition. One possibility is that the greater length of the text in the analogy condition led to decreased overall memory. We explore this further in Experiment 2. However, differential false-alarm rates show that the answers to analogical inferences were not simply the result of poor memory or of a generalized response bias in the analogy groups.
We also found that the false recognition of analogical inferences occurred both when participants read larger and smaller amounts of information on the target issue. There was no difference between the short and long versions for intrusion errors. In addition, this study showed that people can accurately recognize the analogical source that was presented although still erroneously recognizing inferences as if the inferences were information that had been presented.
Experiment 2
This second study was designed to explore three different issues related to the results found in Experiment 1. First, we wanted to investigate whether the rate of false alarms on analogical inferences in the analogy groups was due to the 1-week delay between the presentation of the information and the memory test. Second, we wanted to add further controls to the experimental procedure. Third, we wanted to examine in more detail the status of analogical inferences in participants' representation.
In Experiment 1, there was a 1-week delay between reading the target and source information and the recognition test. Time is an important factor related to the accuracy of memory (Slamecka & McElree, 1983) , and the 1-week delay may have been an important component of the results. Intrusion errors could be more frequent at longer delays. It is possible that participants might correctly answer that analogical inferences have not actually been presented if their memory is tested at a shorter delay. To investigate this possibility, in Experiment 2, we asked participants to read the information and perform the recognition test during the same session.
We also wanted to add further controls to the experimental procedure. In the previous experiment, participants in the analogy condition read the description of an analogical source in addition to the rest of the information. Thus, an additional difference a Measure of response sensitivity: hits ("yes" answers to text items) minus false alarms ("yes" answers to novel items). b Measure of differential false alarms: false alarms ("yes" answers) to analogical inferences minus false alarms to novel items.
between the groups was that the experimental group read more text. To ensure that the additional paragraph in itself was not the cause of the differences found on the memory task, particularly differences in sensitivity observed between the analogy and control groups, we included an additional paragraph of the same length in the control condition in Experiment 2.
Finally, we also wanted to examine in more detail the status of analogical inferences in participants' representation of the target. We added a third condition in which analogical inferences were provided explicitly. In this condition, the last paragraph that participants read contained all the analogical inferences that we tested for in the recognition test. If the analogical inferences that participants draw are effectively integrated to the target representation, then we should find no difference between the responses of participants who read the inferences explicitly and of those who read the source analog and drew inferences.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Thirty-six undergraduate students from McGill University participated in this study. They were compensated for their time ($7). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. The procedure used was similar to that of Experiment 1, with two important changes. First, participants did not answer the two reasoning questions after reading the information text. Rather, they performed a distractor task. Second, participants performed the recognition test during the same session in which they read the information texts, after completing the distractor task.
The experimental session took place as follows. Participants first read the information text on the marijuana issue, which was followed by either the analogical source (analogy condition), the inferences (explicitinferences condition), or the filler paragraph (no-analogy condition). They then completed the distractor task. This was a causal-reasoning task concerning a car-accident situation that took 15 min to complete.
After the distractor task, participants completed the recognition test on a computer. The instructions were the same as those used in Experiment 1. Statements were presented individually on the screen, and participants had to press the 1 key if the sentence was in the text they had read previously, or the 2 key if the sentence was not in the text. There were 10 practice trials before the 35 test items. Among the practice trials, there were an equal number of text items and novel items. The test items were presented in a random order generated by the computer program (SuperLab; SuperLab User's Guide, 1990), except for one item testing memory for the analogical source, which was always presented last.
Materials
Information texts. Because we found no difference between the short and long text versions in Experiment 1, we used only the long version in this experiment. The last paragraph varied across conditions. In the analogy condition, the last paragraph contained the description of the source analog. In the no-analogy condition, an additional paragraph was added so that the length of the text would match that of the analogy condition. This paragraph made concluding remarks on the debate presented in the text. The added paragraph contained 144 words in eight sentences, which is comparable with the paragraph describing the source analog, which contained 116 words in eight sentences. The added paragraph did not contain any information related to the prohibition of alcohol or any other source analogs.
In the explicit-inferences condition, the last paragraph contained all analogical inferences that could be derived from the description of the source analog in the analogy condition. As in the analogy condition, the paragraph started with the sentence "The situation with marijuana can be compared to the time when alcohol was prohibited." However, unlike the analogy condition, in which the rest of the paragraph described the situation with alcohol (the source), in this case all statements described the marijuana situation (the target). For example, if in the analogy condition one sentence read "Because alcohol was illegal, people still used it but had to buy it on the black market," the equivalent sentence in the explicitinferences condition would read "Because marijuana is illegal, people still use it but have to buy it on the black market." These statements were the analogical inferences that we tested for in the recognition test. To ensure that the paragraph was easily understood and made sense to the participants, we added short phrases in four places to reiterate the link between the marijuana and alcohol situations (e.g., "similarly to the period when alcohol was prohibited . . . ").
Recognition test. The recognition test used in this study was the same as that used in the long condition of the previous experiment. The only difference was that the test was administered on a computer.
As was the case in the previous experiment, we derived three separate scores from participants' answers to the 35 items: proportion of "yes" answers to text items, novel items, and analogical inferences. The only difference between this experiment and the previous experiment was that in the explicit-inferences condition, answering "yes" to analogical inferences would in fact have been correct.
Results
We first performed a 3 ϫ 3 mixed ANOVA on the proportion of "yes" answers. Item type was entered as a within-subjects factor with three levels (text item, novel item, and analogical inference), whereas condition was entered in the analyses as a betweensubjects factor, also with three levels (no-analogy, analogy, and explicit-inferences). This revealed a significant interaction between item type and condition, F(4, 66) ϭ 7.33, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ .161. The mean proportion of "yes" answers to the different types of items are presented in Table 2 .
Analysis of simple effects shows that, as predicted, there was a significant difference between conditions for analogical inferences, F(2, 33) ϭ 8.5, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ .388. Planned comparisons were performed to compare the proportion of "yes" answers to analogical inferences in the analogy and no-analogy conditions. The results of these comparisons and means for the different groups are presented in Table 3 . These analyses reveal that the no-analogy condition significantly differed from both the analogy and the explicit-inferences conditions. Comparing the means of the analogy and explicit-inferences conditions, however, shows no significant difference. Participants in these two conditions were more likely to recognize analogical inferences than were participants in the no-analogy condition.
Also in accordance with our prediction, there was no difference between conditions in the proportion of "yes" answers to text items, F(2, 33) ϭ 1.95, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .026; and novel items, F(2, 33) ϭ 0.13, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .002.
Sensitivity Measures
We again computed two measures of sensitivity, the means of which for the different conditions are reported in Table 2 . The first measure, meant to assess overall sensitivity, consists of hits (proportion of "yes" answers to text items) minus false alarms ("yes" answers to novel items). In this experiment, the analogy and no-analogy groups did not appear to differ in overall sensitivity. Furthermore, the rate of differential false alarms (proportion of "yes" answers to analogical inferences minus the proportion of "yes" answers to novel items) was again higher in the analogy group.
Comparison With Experiment 1
Although we were able to replicate the results found in the previous experiment with a shorter time delay, we wanted to examine this in more detail. Because we used the same recognition test in Experiment 1, in which there was a 1-week delay, and Experiment 2, in which there was a 15-min delay, we were able to statistically compare participants' answers in the two experiments. We first performed a general 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 3 mixed ANOVA with condition (analogy, no analogy) and delay (1 week, same session) as between-subjects factors and item type as the within-subject variable. This analysis reveals no main effect of delay, F(1, 47) ϭ 0.263, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .010; and no three-way interaction, F(2, 94) ϭ 0.246, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .030. We find that 2 two-way interactions were significant: Delay ϫ Item type, F(2, 94) ϭ 3.57, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ .090; and Condition ϫ Item type, F(2, 94) ϭ 4.83, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ .130. The interaction between delay and item type shows that there was no difference in participants' answers to text items, F(1, 51) ϭ 1.08, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .010; and analogical inferences, F(1, 51) ϭ 0.275, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .020 at 1 week and during the same session. However, a greater proportion of "yes" answers to novel items was found at the 1-week delay (M ϭ .21, SD ϭ .17) compared with the same session (M ϭ .10, SD ϭ .09), F(1, 51) ϭ 9.0, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ .170. The two-way interaction between item type and condition replicates the results found in Experiments 1 and 2. Thus, overall, the delay between presentation of the source and target and the presentation of the memory test affects answers to novel items but not those to analogical inferences and text items.
Discussion
In this experiment, we further explored how analogical inferences can alter the representation of target information. We investigated whether the time delay between the memory test and the presentation of the source and target affected whether participants would falsely recognize analogical inferences. It does not appear to be the case. Participants whose memory was tested during the same session as they read the information showed the same rate of "yes" answers to analogical inferences as did participants who were tested after a 1-week delay. We did, however, find that there was a difference for the novel items. Intrusion errors for statements not related to the analogy were more likely after a 1-week delay. This was not the case for analogical inferences, for which errors were as likely within the same session. Thus, we were able to replicate the basic finding using a shorter delay between presentation of the texts and test.
We also showed that participants who had not read but simply inferred certain statements were just as likely to answer "yes" in a recognition test as were participants who in fact had read these inferences. Reading the description of an analogical source and drawing inferences led to the same pattern of answers as did explicitly reading these inferences. This is surprising, given that answering "yes" to analogical inferences would in fact be incorrect in the analogy condition but correct in the explicit-inferences condition. The answers of participants in the explicit-inferences condition to text items and analogical items were very similar (M ϭ .76 and .78), as we predicted. This suggests that participants in the analogy condition are treating analogical inferences in the same way as items that were actually presented in the text.
Experiment 2 also allowed us to rule out the possibility that our results were due to the confounded factor of additional text length. We replicated the results of the previous experiment with a control condition in which an additional paragraph of similar length was inserted. This allowed us to rule out the possibility that extra length, rather than analogical reasoning, was responsible for the differences found in Experiment 1. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 overall sensitivity was comparable across the analogy and noanalogy conditions, suggesting that the additional paragraph read a Measure of response sensitivity: hits ("yes" answers to text items) minus false alarms ("yes" answers to novel items). b Measure of differential false alarms: false alarms ("yes" answers) to analogical inferences minus false alarms to novel items. in the analogy condition in the previous experiment may account for the difference in overall sensitivity. With these first two experiments, we were able to identify a phenomenon by which analogical reasoning significantly alters representation of target information. In these experiments, people erroneously recognized analogical inferences as if they had been presented in a text, when in fact they had not. We have also shown that this effect can occur when people read a greater or lesser amount of information on the target and that it can be observed at different time delays.
Experiment 3
In the previous experiments, we used the debate over the legalization of marijuana as the target issue, with the source analog being the prohibition of alcohol. It is conceivable that most of our participants were familiar with this debate. A number of studies have shown that knowledge about the source and target, as well as the richness with which the source and target are encoded, can affect analogical reasoning (Dunbar, Blanchette, & Chung, 2002; Novick, 1988; Wharton, Holyoak, & Lange, 1996) . In Experiment 3, we wanted to investigate whether the effect that we found extends to issues with which people are less familiar.
In addition, the specific source analog we used, the prohibition of alcohol, has two features that could influence analogical mapping. First, the prohibition of alcohol is frequently used in this debate. It is likely that many of our participants who were exposed to information concerning the debate over the legalization of marijuana were also exposed to this precise analogy. This raises the question of whether the results would generalize to situations in which people have not previously been exposed to a specific source analog. The second, and maybe more important, feature of the source analog we used is that the prohibition of alcohol shares high superficial similarity with the target domain. Both domains refer to drugs for which the government regulates use. Research shows that superficial similarity can facilitate mapping (Bassok, 1990; Novick & Holyoak, 1991; Ross, 1987 Ross, , 1989 . It is not clear whether people would draw analogical inferences if the source and target domains shared less superficial similarity.
To answer these questions, we conducted another experiment using the same procedure but different materials. We decided to use the debate over the destruction of remaining samples of the smallpox virus. Briefly, this debate has the following components: (a) Smallpox is the first and only virus to have been eradicated by human action; (b) stocks of the smallpox virus are kept in a few laboratories; (c) keeping stocks of the virus represents a potential health hazard; (d) scientific interests, as well as certain political concerns, argue against the destruction of the remaining stocks of the virus. At the time we ran the experiment, this problem had not been widely covered by the media. We expected our participants would not be as familiar with this issue as they possibly were with the debate over legalization of marijuana. In addition, we selected a source analog that shared little superficial similarity with the target problem to explore whether our previous results would generalize to situations in which the source and target domains did not share superficial similarity.
Another issue we were concerned with in the previous studies has to do with how the analogical inference items were generated. For the purpose of the recognition test, we derived analogical inferences simply by replacing certain words or concepts in sentences that were actually read by participants in the analogy condition. Therefore, part of the sentences presented as analogical inferences in the recognition test were familiar to people in the analogy condition but not to people in the control condition. Certain models of memory suggest that the process of recognition can be based on overall familiarity (Gillund & Shiffrin, 1984; Jacoby, Jones, & Dolan, 1998; Yonelinas, 1997) . Thus, it could be hypothesized that rather than analogical reasoning, general familiarity with test sentences (analogical inferences) could explain the higher proportion of "yes" answers in the analogy condition. We wanted to rule out this possible alternative explanation for the results. To do this, we changed the way in which we generated the novel items for the recognition test. In the previous experiments, novel items were sentences that were plausible but not present in the text. In the present experiment, we derived the novel items through the same method used for analogical inferences. The resulting novel items would elicit the same degree of general familiarity for both participants in the analogy and no-analogy groups, as would the analogical inferences for participants in the analogy condition. By comparing recognition rates for novel items and analogical inferences, we could determine whether general familiarity was a plausible account for the results of the previous studies. If participants show the same proportion of "yes" answers to novel items and analogical inferences, then familiarity is likely responsible for our results. If, however, as we hypothesized, analogical reasoning is responsible for the results found in the previous experiments, then participants in the analogy condition should still make more false alarms on the analogical inferences than they (and control participants) make on the novel items.
Method
Participants and Procedure
Twenty-four university students from McGill University participated in this study. The procedure used is the same as the one we used in Experiment 2. The only addition was that after completing the recognition test, participants were given a short questionnaire concerning their prior knowledge of the issue.
Materials
Information texts. The bulk of the text described the debate over the destruction of the smallpox virus. Important events and decisions reached by international institutions such as the World Health Organization were described, and arguments frequently used in the debate were presented. The part of the text that was read by participants in both the analogy and the no-analogy conditions contained 1,579 words and 159 propositions.
In the analogy condition, the final paragraph of the text described a potential source analog: the debate over the elimination of nuclear weapons. The description of the source analog was composed of 61 propositions and 522 words. Examples of these statements can be found in Appendix B. In the no-analogy condition, participants read an additional paragraph that was of the same length as the description of the source analog (522 words) but had nothing to do with the nuclear weapons analogy. It described in more details the symptoms and consequences of contracting the smallpox virus.
Recognition test. The recognition test included 8 text items (sentences actually present in the text), 12 novel items (sentences not in the text), and 15 analogical inferences. The analogical inferences were derived through the same method used in the previous studies. To equate the level of familiarity elicited by analogical inferences and novel items, we constructed the novel items by taking sentences from the text and simply replacing a word or concept with one that was incorrect. For instance, the sentence "The smallpox disease met its end in the body of a 23-year-old cook named Ali Maow Maalin" was in fact in the text. We simply changed the word cook for doctor to produce a novel item for which the correct answer would be "no."
Posttask questionnaire. After they completed the task, participants were given a short questionnaire with two questions that assessed their prior knowledge on the debate surrounding smallpox. The first question asked them whether they had heard of this debate prior to participating in the experiment. The second question asked them to estimate how familiar they were with the issue, prior to the experiment, on a scale from 1 (not at all familiar) to 7 (highly familiar).
Results and Discussion
Our first goal with this experiment was to see whether our results could be replicated with a different set of materials, using an issue with which people were less familiar. The proportion of "yes" answers were entered into a 2 ϫ 3 mixed ANOVA with condition (analogy, no analogy) as a between-subjects factor and item type (text item, novel item, analogical inference) as a withinsubject factor. There was a significant interaction, F(1, 22) ϭ 3.65, p Ͻ .01, MSE ϭ .117. The mean proportion of "yes" answers to the different types of items are presented in Table 4 as well as the means of the two sensitivity measures. A test of the simple effects reveals that there was a significant difference in the answers of the two groups to analogical inferences, F(1, 22) ϭ 6.82, p Ͻ .015, MSE ϭ .236. Participants in the analogy group answered "yes" to the analogical inferences in a greater proportion than did participants in the no-analogy condition. There was no difference between the two groups' answers to text items, F(1, 22) ϭ 0.4057, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .002; and novel items, F(1, 22) ϭ 0.824, p Ͼ .05, MSE ϭ .018. This replicates the findings of the previous studies. Thus, results show that the same effect can be found when source and target do not share many superficial features.
Examining participants' answers to the posttask questionnaire reveals that the majority of people were not familiar with this debate. Nineteen of the 24 participants (79%) had not heard of this debate prior to participating in this experiment. When asked to evaluate their familiarity with the topic on a scale from 1 to 7, the average mean of participants' answers was 2.0. This was similar in the analogy and no-analogy conditions. Thus, we have been able to replicate our results using a topic with which participants were not familiar.
Experiment 3 allowed us to rule out the possibility that our results were due to a general familiarity effect with analogical inferences presented in the recognition test. In this experiment, novel items were derived through the same method as analogical inferences, and thus had the same level of overall familiarity for participants in the analogy condition. Participants in the analogy condition answered "yes" more to analogical inferences than they did to novel items. Furthermore, the proportion of "yes" answers to analogical inferences in the analogy condition was higher than the proportion of "yes" answers to novel items in the no-analogy condition.
Experiment 4
The previous experiment showed that analogical inferences can be made with unfamiliar topics and that the source and target do not have to be superficially similar for the effect to occur. However, a question that remains is precisely when are participants mapping the source onto the target and drawing inferences. We hypothesized that participants are drawing inferences at the time they are reading the source passage. Having formed a representation of the target, when the source is presented, participants can map the incoming information onto the target and draw inferences when encountering information about the source that has no corresponding elements in the target. In Experiment 4, we investigated participants' reading times of the source passage to examine this hypothesis.
In this experiment, we again used the issue of the eradication of smallpox but with different texts. The target and source texts were of similar lengths. All sentences from the target text had corresponding sentences in the source description, except for potential inferences. Potential inferences were pieces of information that were given about the source but not the target. In the analogy condition the target text was read first, followed by the source text. In a control condition, participants read only the source text, without having previously read the target text. Under the assumption that reading times reflect amount of processing (Graesser, Swamer, & Hu, 1997; Post, 1984) and that drawing an analogical inference should require extra processing (compared with simply reading the same sentence), we predicted that participants in the analogy condition would take longer than participants in the control condition to read potential inferences but not other sentences. a Measure of response sensitivity: hits ("yes" answers to text items) minus false alarms ("yes" answers to novel items). b Measure of differential false alarms: false alarms ("yes" answers) to analogical inferences minus false alarms to novel items.
Method Participants and Procedure
Thirty-seven undergraduate students participated in this study. They were assigned randomly to the analogy or to the control condition. There were 17 participants in the analogy condition and 20 in the control condition. Participants were simply asked to read texts that would be presented on the computer. The texts appeared sentence by sentence on the computer screen. Participants had to read the sentence and press the space bar to proceed to the next sentence. Their reading times were recorded, from the time the sentence appeared on the screen to the time when they pressed the space bar.
In the analogy condition, participants read the target text (smallpox issue) and then read the source text (nuclear weapons). In the control condition, participants simply read the source text (nuclear weapons).
Materials
The target and source text were analogous but did not use the same wording. The information provided by each sentence in the target text was mapped to a sentence in the source text. Important exceptions include potential inferences. These are sentences contained in the source text that have no correspondence in the target text. These sentences, if mapped over to the source, would be analogical inferences. If participants in the analogy condition were drawing inferences when reading the source text, they should have taken longer to read the potential inferences compared with participants in the control condition. Examples of the stimuli used are presented in Table 5 .
Results and Discussion
Our dependent measure was the average reading time (RT) per sentence. Distribution of the RTs was examined, and the participants with RTs above or below two standard deviations from the mean were excluded. We excluded the data from 7 participants, 3 from the analogy condition and 4 from the control condition.
We entered the RTs in a general 2 ϫ 2 mixed ANOVA with condition (analogy, control) as a between-subjects factor and sentence type (potential inference, other sentences) as a within-subject factor. There was a significant interaction, F(1, 28) ϭ 5.92, p Ͻ .05, MSE ϭ .590. We performed t tests to locate where differences could be found. Using a one-tailed significance level, we found a significant difference between the RTs of participants in the control and analogy groups for potential inferences, t(28) ϭ 1.79, p Ͻ .05; but no difference for other sentences, t(28) ϭ .51, p Ͼ .05. Participants who had previously read the target text took longer than participants who had not, to read potential inferences but not other sentences (see Table 6 ).
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that analogical reasoning is taking place at the time when people are processing the source information. Participants who had previously read the target text took longer to read potential inferences than did participants who had not previously read the target text. This suggests that extra processing is taking place at that time. We argue that this extra processing is the drawing of analogical inferences. These data also suggest that in the previous experiments, answers to the recognition test may be explained by analogical reasoning that took place before the recognition test, at the time of encoding the source.
General Discussion
The goal of the research reported in this series of studies was to investigate whether people generate analogical inferences and, if so, whether these inferences alter their representation for target information. In the first three experiments, we presented participants with information about a target problem, which was followed either by the description of a potential source analog or by either unrelated information (Experiments 2 and 3) or no additional information (Experiment 1). When we later tested participants' memory for the target information, we consistently found that those who had read the description of the source falsely included analogical inferences in their memory for the target information. We obtained these results when participants read both larger and a In fact, recent polls indicate that there is a sudden increase of general interest in the debate over nuclear weapons. 3. A common-sense opinion is that the world would only be better off without the disease, and that the samples should be disposed of.
3. On the one hand, it seems that it would be a marvelous thing to completely destroy all stocks of nuclear weapons.
a Potential inference and corresponding sentence in the source description. smaller amounts of information on the target issue (Experiment 1), when the source and target were presented on the same day or 1 week apart (Experiment 1 vs. Experiment 2), and regardless of whether the source and target were superficially similar or different (Experiment 3 compared with Experiments 1 and 2). Furthermore, sensitivity measures showed that participants who read the analogy did not simply have a poorer memory overall or a generalized tendency to commit more false alarms (Experiments 2 and 3). Experiment 4 also provided further evidence that analogical reasoning is responsible for the differences found on the recognition-test answers and that participants may be drawing inferences at the time of reading the source passage. Our results suggest that people were able to align the information provided about the target and the source and draw inferences. Most important, these inferences altered their representation of the target. This shows one way in which the effects of analogy use may go beyond simply using elements of the source to understand the target while mapping. Our results suggest that mapping can lead to important changes in target representation. Participants were not able to differentiate between their inferences and information that was actually presented about the target.
Much empirical research has been conducted on analogical mapping, and detailed models of this process have been proposed. One such proposal is the copy-with-substitution-and-generation process (Holyoak, Novick, & Melz, 1994; Markman 1997) . This is a plausible mechanism to account for how the inferences came to be integrated in the target representation. Structures of the source and target are aligned. On the basis of this alignment, certain elements of the source are carried over and corresponding elements for the target are substituted. Our results show that this process can have profound influences on the representation of the target, even after mapping is over.
One study has looked at the effect of analogy on memory. Schustack and Anderson (1979) also found that analogies can lead to false recognition of information that was not presented but that is congruent with the analogical source. They presented participants with short (four sentences) biographies of fictitious characters that were based on actual famous people. In one condition, it was explicitly said that the fictitious character resembled Famous Person X. In another condition, the same information was presented but the parallel to the real world person was not made. The former condition led to an increase in false alarms to statements that were plausible given the analogical source. This is similar to the effect that we obtained. However, there are several features that distinguish ours from the Schustack and Anderson study. First, we used one target domain that was complex and for which participants received much information. Second, we let participants form a representation of a target domain and then introduced a potential analog, rather than pointing to the analog before encoding of the target information, as was the case in the Schustack and Anderson study. Third, and most important, in the Schustack and Anderson study, the effect was found only in the condition in which participants were strongly encouraged to use the analogy, both at encoding and at the time of the recognition test. In our studies, we only pointed to a possible link between the source and target with a short sentence and only at the time of encoding. Both studies nevertheless point to the potentially important effects of analogical comparisons on memory for target information.
An important feature of this series of experiments was that we did not explicitly ask participants to use the analogical source or direct them to draw mappings from the source to the target. There were no explicit instructions asking participants to engage in mapping and draw inferences, although the relevance of the source in understanding the target was pointed out to participants. This closely parallels the ways in which analogies are used in naturalistic settings, particularly political rhetoric. This also lends support to models of analogical reasoning, which consistently emphasize the importance of analogy as a central cognitive tool. Our experiments show that once a representation of a target domain is formed (here reading the target text), the presentation of a source analog can lead to alterations in that representation. Thus, this suggests one way in which analogical reasoning results in representational change, even without explicit and directed mapping. The importance of analogical reasoning in everyday reasoning may thus be considerable.
A possible alternative explanation for the difference in performance on memory tests, other than analogical mapping, relates to the type of strategy used to answer the memory test. It could be argued that participants answered the recognition test on the basis of general familiarity. We were able to rule out this hypothesis in Experiment 3. In that experiment, the novel items were derived the same way as were the analogical inferences, and therefore both types of items had the same level of familiarity. Using this methodology, we found that the differential rate of false alarms to analogical inferences and novel items was still greater in the analogy condition. Thus, general familiarity with the statements was ruled out as a possible alternative explanation.
Research on analogical reasoning has generally focused on how analogical sources are retrieved, how source and target are mapped, and how inferences are drawn. Both empirical and theoretical work have contributed detailed descriptions of how these processes are carried out and the factors that influence them. Our results extend the scope of current research by showing that the process of mapping and drawing inferences can have important consequences on the representation of the target. Overall, the research reported here indicates that analogy is one potential way that underlying representations of complex knowledge can be changed. The changes that occur can last for at least 1 week and change the underlying representation of information. Thus, analogy is not only useful in solving problems or understanding brief passages but is a cognitive mechanism for updating representations. Furthermore, it may be the case that analogical inferences are frequently used when understanding complex issues such as the ones used in these experiments. Nuclear technology is dangerous; it is one of the biggest threats during a war. It may even be dangerous when used in laboratories for good purposes.
Viral historians say it [the virus] probably began as an epidemic disease 10,000 years ago when human populations first grew dense.
The only thing needed to use nuclear technology without risk is to have strict regulations and safety rules so that security is assured, which is possible to do with political and public will.
Evidence that the disease has existed for at least three millennia is found in the scars on the head and shoulders of the Pharaoh Ramses V.
Nuclear weapons may not only be used in war, but also by terrorists who may attack unpredictably.
This virus is highly stable outside its host and can retain its powers of infection over long periods of time. Moreover, it is very costly to keep nuclear stocks in a safe place.
After a person is exposed, the virus multiplies rapidly and spreads unobtrusively through the body's lymph system for about two weeks.
